Liberal neutrality requires that, given the diversity of conceptions of the good life held by people, the state should be in some sense neutral between these conceptions. Just what that sense is has been a matter of debate but it seems generally accepted that neutrality is a property of the justifications for government action and not of the consequences of such action. In other words, the state must be neutral by avoiding invoking any conception of the good in its justification (...) for laws and policies and by avoiding having any laws and policies that can be justified only by reference to some conception of the good. It need not, so it seems generally accepted, ensure that the consequences of its laws and policies do not favor some conceptions of the good over others. Against this commonly held view, in this chapter I argue that justificatory neutrality is inadequate as a full picture of what liberal neutrality means and that some conception of consequential neutrality is more plausible. (shrink)

In Beyond Neutrality, George Sher criticises the idea that state neutrality between competing conceptions of the good helps protect society from oppression. While he is correct that some governments are non-neutral without being oppressive, I argue that those governments may be neutral at the core of their foundations. The possibility of non-neutrality leading to oppression is further explored; some conceptions of the good would favour oppression while others would not. While it is possible that a non-neutral state may avoid oppression, (...) it is argued that the risks are so great that it is better to bet on government being neutral, thereby minimizing the possibility of oppression. (shrink)

A major argument for vegetarianism is that eating animals causes unjustified suffering. While this argument has been articulated by several people, it has received surprisingly little attention. Here I restate it in a way that I believe is most convincing, considering and rejecting the two main justifications for causing suffering in order to eat animals. I compare it to some other prominent arguments for vegetarianism, and discuss a major objection to the argument which focuses on whether the animals would not (...) exist if not bred to be eaten. (shrink)

This article argues that deciding when to die is a matter of individuality.

This essay addresses the role of trust in political philosophy. In particular, it examines the idea that trust is necessary for a particular type of government action — paternalistic action — to be justified. Liberal theory and liberal democratic practice are characterized by a large degree of anti-paternalism, understanding paternalism to be the restriction of individual liberty for a person’s good, instead of to protect or benefit others. It would be a mistake to think that liberal democracies have no paternalism; (...) seatbelt, motorcycle helmet, and drug prohibition laws, for example, are probably at least partly motivated by paternalistic reasons. But it is easy to imagine more pervasive paternalism. Society could, and does in some cultures, restrict people’s choices of occupation, marriage partners, and where to live, with the rationale that these restrictions are for people’s good. Many people believe that the liberal position is the correct one, that more pervasive paternalism would be unjustified, but what is the philosophical justification for anti-paternalism? (shrink)

What makes individual freedom valuable? People have always believed in freedom, have sought it, and have sometimes fought and died for it. The belief that it is something to be valued is widespread. But does this belief have a rational foundation? This book examines answers to these questions that are based on the welfare of the person whose freedom is at stake. There are various conceptions of a worthwhile life, a life that is valuable for the person whose life it (...) is. These conceptions will be examined to see whether they are plausible and what their connection, if any, is to freedom. Are they compelling foundations for freedom? Does freedom make a person’s life better or would his/her welfare be advanced by restricting freedom? (shrink)

The aim of this book is to explore some of the relations between morality and politics. Areas in which these are explored include the role of ideals in foreign policy , committing evil for the sake of a greater good in wartime, and lying and deception in political affairs. Illustrative examples are used throughout and include the Iraq war and its political fallout , Allied and Axis actions during the Second World War, decisions made by former Australian Prime Minister John (...) Howard and thought-experiments such as whether to lie about the Jewish family hiding in the basement when the Nazis come knocking at the door.Chapters 1 and 2, making up the first half of the book, are the highlight of it. In them, Coady confronts the realist critique of morality in foreign …. (shrink)

When, if ever, is paternalism justified? I defend the principle that paternalism is justified only if it is neutral, that is, the motivation for it is compatible with all conceptions of the good life. Three other principles of paternalism are examined. The balancing view says that we must balance the values of liberty and well-being against each other and that paternalism is justified only if well-being outweighs liberty. The consent principle says that paternalism is justified only if consented to. The (...) voluntariness principle says that intervention is justified only when the conduct in question is substantially nonvoluntary. These three views are either implausible, plausible only if they are supplemented with the neutrality principle, or plausible only because they already presuppose that principle. (shrink)